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Humans gain a wide range of knowledge through interacting with the environment. Each aspect of
our perceptual experiences offers a unique source of information about the world—colours are seen,
sounds heard and textures felt. Understanding how perceptual input provides a basis for knowledge
is thus central to understanding one’s own and others’ epistemic states. Developmental research
suggests that 5-year-olds have an immature understanding of knowledge sources and that they over-
estimate the knowledge to be gained from looking. Without evidence from adults, it is not clear
whether the mature reasoning system outgrows this overestimation. The current study is the ﬁrst to
investigate whether an overestimation of the knowledge to be gained from vision occurs in adults.
Novel response time paradigms were adapted from developmental studies. In two experiments,
participants judged whether an object or feature could be identiﬁed by performing a speciﬁc action.
Adult participants found it disproportionately easy to accept looking as a proposed action when it
was informative, and difﬁcult to reject looking when it was not informative. This suggests that
adults, like children, overestimate the informativeness of vision. The origin of this overestimation
and the implications that the current ﬁndings bear on the interpretation of children’s overestimation
are discussed.
Keywords: Theory of mind; Source of knowledge; Aspectuality; Epistemic mental state; Folk
psychology
Reasoning about epistemic states is a key process
that guides social behaviour. One crucial com-
ponent of epistemic reasoning concerns how
knowledge about the world is acquired. In particu-
lar, how knowledge is gained from interacting with
the world. For example, someone who looks at a
cup of tea perceives the colour of the brew,
whereas someone who touches the same cup per-
ceives the temperature of the tea. This source of
knowledge reasoning provides a link between percep-
tual experiences and the ensuing knowledge that is
gained (O’Neill, Astington, & Flavell, 1992;
Pillow, 1989; Robinson, Thomas, Parton, & Nye,
1997). Linking perceptual access with subsequent
knowledge is not only crucial for understanding
our own epistemic states (Perner & Ruffman,
1995), but it is also an essential feature of under-
standing other people’s epistemic states. Despite
the clear relevance that source of knowledge reason-
ing has in diverse areas of research (e.g., theory of
mind, metacognition and episodic memory), as
well as real-life social interactions, little is known
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about the way in which adults engage in such
reasoning.1
The majority of prior research has focused on
the developmental trajectory of source of knowl-
edge reasoning and we ﬁrst turn to this existing lit-
erature. A number of studies suggest that between
2½ and 5 years of age, children learn about the
causal relationships between the world and their
own minds, as well as others’ minds. Around 2½
to 3 years of age, children start to relate their own
visual experience with knowledge (Call &
Carpenter, 2001) and only attribute knowledge to
people performing perceptual acts, not to those per-
forming non-perceptual acts (Pillow, 1989, 1993).
By the age of 4, their understanding of the speciﬁc
experiences gained from different perceptual access
to the world improves signiﬁcantly (hereafter
referred to as understanding of aspectuality,
O’Neill & Chong, 2001). For example, 4-year-
olds are better than 3-year-olds at specifying the
correct action that allows them to verify whether
an object has a speciﬁc property (for instance,
ﬁnding out if a glass of water contains sugar or
not, ﬁnding out if a ball is red or green). By the
age of 5, children are close to the developmental
endpoint of understanding aspectuality (O’Neill
et al., 1992; Pillow, 1993), but, as we summarize
below, they are still not ﬂawless when judging the
knowledge to be gained from looking (O’Neill
et al., 1992; Robinson et al., 1997).
Robinson et al. (1997) suggest that children at 5
years of age overestimate the knowledge they can
gain from looking. In the second experiment of
this study, 5- and 8-year-olds were presented
with pairs of objects that looked identical but dif-
fered in weight or sound, as well as objects that
looked different but weighed or sounded the
same. The experimenter covered the two objects
with a cloth and removed one of the two objects
out of children’s sight. The experimenter asked
the children to predict whether they would know
which object had been chosen by just looking at
the object. After the children responded, feedback
was given to them. Results showed that both 5-
and 8-year-olds were highly accurate in their
responses when the pair of objects looked different.
However, when presented with a pair of objects
that looked the same but were weighted differently
or sounded different, 5-year-olds carried on pre-
dicting that they would know the object’s identity
just by looking at it. Even following verbal feed-
back, children did not improve their performance.
Overestimation of knowledge gained from
vision is not restricted to reasoning about one’s
own knowledge of the world; a similar overestima-
tion is apparent when children reason about others’
knowledge. For instance, children have the ten-
dency to over-attribute knowledge to a person
who looks at an object, but not to a person who
feels the same object (O’Neill et al., 1992). In the
second experiment of O’Neill et al., 3-, 4-, and
5½-year-olds were asked to judge two puppets’
knowledge of a hidden object. Children chose
one of two objects that either looked the same
but felt different or looked different but felt the
same. The chosen object was hidden inside a
tunnel whilst the puppets were not looking. One
puppet performed an action that allowed the
identiﬁcation of the hidden object (e.g., feeling a
soft object), whilst the other puppet performed
the alternative action (e.g., looking at the soft
object). Children were asked to choose the puppet
that knew about the differentiating feature of the
selected object. Consistent with Pillow (1993),
results showed that 3-year-olds failed to distinguish
between the knowledge states of the two puppets,
while 4- and 5½-year-olds were at chance when
comparing knowledge states of the puppet that
looked versus the puppet that felt the object. The
error patterns of the 4- and 5½-year-olds showed
that they failed by choosing the puppet that
looked inside the tunnel as the one to know about
the tactile properties of the hidden object, thus
over-attributing knowledge gained through vision.
1Although studies on false memory (e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, 2002) showed that adult witnesses appear to confuse information
sources, such as seeing something with their own eyes versus being told about an event. There is a distinction to be made between
committing a mistake in remembering an information source from the past versus reasoning online about the information to be
gained from a particular source at present. The current study focuses on the latter.
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It has been argued that the overestimation of the
knowledge to be gained from vision is driven by
children’s immature understanding of knowledge
sources (e.g., O’Neill et al., 1992; Robinson et al.,
1997). According to this account, as older children
acquire a mature source of knowledge reasoning
system, they would outgrow such overestimation.
An alternative is that the overestimation reﬂects a
constant feature of source of knowledge reasoning
across the lifespan. Curiously, however, there has
been no investigation of the mature mental state
reasoning system to verify these accounts. Solely
based on evidence from developmental studies, it
is not clear whether the overestimation is a result
of children’s immature reasoning or whether it
might reﬂect a bias embedded in the mature
source of knowledge reasoning system. There are
reasons to suspect that the bias may persist into
adulthood since previous studies indicate that
adults show biases in their reasoning about knowl-
edge. For example, evidence suggests that adults
make biased predictions based on their own privi-
leged knowledge, instead of a protagonist’s ignor-
ance (e.g., Birch & Bloom, 2004). Moreover,
adult speakers frequently underestimate the ambi-
guity in their speech and overestimate the degree
to which others comprehend their intention
(Keysar & Henly, 2002). Therefore, even in fully
developed minds it is clear that biases in reasoning
about knowledge exist. Thus, we set out to examine
mature source of knowledge reasoning in
adulthood.
The current study employed novel response time
paradigms adapted from developmental studies
(O’Neill et al., 1992; Robinson et al., 1997). In
two experiments, adult participants were asked to
judge whether an object or an object feature can
be identiﬁed by performing a given action. To
ensure that any observed bias for vision is an over-
estimation of its informativeness and not an overes-
timation of participants’ own ability (Keysar &
Henly, 2002), the judgements participants made
were about an actor. Each trial paired an actor per-
forming one of three actions with an object or an
object feature. The participants’ task was to
conﬁrm or reject the informativeness of the action
in relation to the object or object feature. If there
is a bias to overestimate the informativeness of
looking in adulthood, it should be reﬂected by the
ease with which correct object-action pairs are
accepted and the difﬁculty with which incorrect
object-action pairs are rejected.
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Participants
Twenty-ﬁve French-speaking undergraduate stu-
dents (ten males, mean age 19 years, age range 17
to 20 years) from the Université catholique de
Louvain took part in this experiment in return for
course credits. An additional two participants’
data were excluded prior to analysis due to having
overall performance at chance level.
Design and procedure
A 3× 2 within-subject design was constructed
with action (look, feel, lift) and object-action con-
gruency (congruent, incongruent) as factors. The
testing session was carried out in French. The
experiment involved observing interactions
between an actor and an experimental device. The
experimental device was explained to participants.
The device consisted of two identical containers,
which were positioned on a stand with two holes
to hold the containers. A black cloth covered the
two containers. Objects with salient features were
positioned on or in the containers. An object’s
most salient feature determined the object’s
location. Objects with salient visual features were
placed on top of the containers. Objects with
salient textures were attached to the bottom of
the containers. Objects with salient weights were
placed inside the containers. Objects could only
be identiﬁed by one correct action. For example,
by lifting the cloth, objects with salient visual fea-
tures could be identiﬁed; by reaching below and
feeling the bottom of the containers, objects with
salient textures could be identiﬁed; by lifting the
containers, objects with salient weights could be
identiﬁed. Participants were shown images of an
actor performing each action with the device
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(Figure 1). These action images were subsequently
employed in the test phase.
During the warm-up phase, the names and
images of six test objects (i.e., objects that were
later used in the test phase: a post-it note, a sheet
of colour label stickers, a sheet of sandpaper, a
cotton ball, a 5 kilogram dumbbell, a 10 pound
dumbbell) along with an additional six ﬁller
objects (i.e., objects used only in the warm-up
phase: a colourful postcard, a colourful business
card, bubble wrap, a sponge, a weight, and a
pétanque ball) were presented to the participants.
Each object had a salient feature (for example, a
post-it has a bright colour, a sheet of sandpaper
has a rough texture, a pétanque ball is heavy) that
could be known by performing one of the three
actions. Each action was relevant for identifying
two test objects and two ﬁller objects (looking
was associated with the post-it, the colour-labelled
stickers, the colourful postcard and the colourful
business card; feeling was associated with the sand-
paper, the bubble wrap, the sponge and the cotton
ball; weight was associated with the two dumbbells,
the weight and the pétanque ball). To ensure that
the designated object categories were consistent
with participants’ object categorization, partici-
pants were required to categorize the objects
according to their most salient features: visual
feature, texture, or weight. All participants correctly
categorized the objects. Finally, the action images
were shown to participants and all participants cor-
rectly named the actions.
The warm-up phase was followed by a test
phase, where participants underwent a computer-
based task. During the test phase, participants
made judgements about the three actions (look,
feel, lift), which were performed to identify the
six test objects (post-it note, colour label stickers,
sandpaper, cotton, 5 kilogram dumbbell, 10
pound dumbbell). Each trial began with a ﬁxation
cross (500 ms), followed by the visual presentation
of an object (1000 ms). Subsequently, an image of
one of the three actions was shown, above which
a question read “Peut-elle le trouver? (Can she ﬁnd
it?)”. The action image remained on the screen
until a response was detected or for 5000 ms,
during which time participants judged whether
the actor could identify the object by performing
the action shown (see Figure 2). Participants
engaged in yes-no responses by left-clicking on
the computer mouse for “yes”, and right-clicking
for “no”.
A total of 144 trials were presented in three test
blocks of 48 trials. All trials were presented in a
Figure 1. Action images employed in Experiments 1 and 2.
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random order. Participants completed an
additional 12 practice trials prior to the test trials
in order to familiarize themselves with the trial
sequence. Feedback was given on the computer
screen immediately after each practice trial to
ensure that the participants fully understood the
task. The experiment was presented with E-prime
(Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002a,
2002b). Response time (RT) and accuracy on
each trial were measured. RTs were measured
from the onset of the action images and accuracy
was calculated in a binary manner (correct or
incorrect).
Data analysis
We submitted the RT data from each condition to
a 3× 2 repeated measures analysis of variance
(ANOVA) with action (look, feel, lift) and
object-action congruency (congruent, incongruent)
as factors. Where an interaction effect was found to
be signiﬁcant, we then calculated the congruency
score for each action condition. This was done by
deducting the RT in the congruent condition
from that in the incongruent condition. The con-
gruency score offers a summary of the ease with
which congruent object-action pairs were accepted
and the difﬁculty with which incongruent object-
action pairs were rejected. It is important to note
that the congruency score represents the absolute
difference between the congruent and incongruent
conditions within each action condition. This
difference is contingent on the overall speed to
which an action condition was responded. In
order to account for this variance, which is inde-
pendent of the congruency scores, we scaled the
congruency scores to the overall speed of responses
in each action condition. This was achieved by
dividing the congruency score in each action con-
dition by the sum of the incongruent and congruent
conditions from the same action condition. More
speciﬁcally, the formula employed to calculate the
scaled congruency scores was (incongruent
condition− congruent condition) ÷ (incongruent
condition+ congruent condition). The scaled con-
gruency score in the look condition was compared
to those in the lift condition and the feel condition,
respectively. A bias to overestimate the informa-
tiveness of vision is likely reﬂected in a dispropor-
tionately larger scaled congruency score.
Results
Error analysis
Response errors comprised 4.32% of the total trials
and no timeout errors occurred. A 3× 2 repeated
measures ANOVA was conducted on error rate
with action (look, feel, lift) and object-action con-
gruency (congruent, incongruent) as factors.
There were no signiﬁcant main effects of action,
F(2, 48)= 1.13, MSE= 0.004, p= .330,
hp2 = .045, or object-action congruency, F(1,
24)= 0.19, MSE= 0.002, p= .671, hp2 = .008,
Figure 2. Trial sequence (translated into English) in Experiment 1: (a) shows a trial from the look-congruent condition, (b) shows a trial from
the look-incongruent condition.
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and no signiﬁcant interaction between action and
object-action congruency, F(2, 48)= 0.95,
MSE= 0.004, p= .394, hp2 = .038.
Response time analysis
Erroneous responses were removed from further
analysis. Responses with RT beyond 2500 ms
(0.61% of the data) were excluded from the analysis
to correct for the positive skew in the overall data
distribution. A 3× 2 ANOVA was conducted on
RT with action (look, feel, lift) and object-action
congruency (congruent, incongruent) as factors.
There was a signiﬁcant main effect of action,
F(2, 48)= 3.64, MSE= 9232.48, p= .034,
hp2 = .132, with the RT associated with the feel
condition (814.75 ms) being slower than that of
the lift condition (769.26 ms) and the look con-
dition (770.44 ms), respectively. There was also a
signiﬁcant main effect of object-action congruency,
F(1, 24)= 23.23, MSE= 5495.51, p, .001,
hp2 = .492, with the RT associated with the con-
gruent condition (755.65 ms) being faster than
that of the incongruent condition (813.99 ms).
The interaction effect between action and object-
action congruency was also signiﬁcant, F(2, 48)=
4.42, MSE= 8145.13, p= .017, hp2 = .155. This
interaction effect was further examined by analysing
the scaled congruency score for each action
condition.
The one-way ANOVA conducted on the scaled
congruency scores with action (look, feel, lift) as the
factor showed a signiﬁcant main effect of action,
F(2, 48)= 4.46, MSE= 0.013, p= .017,
hp2 = .157(see Figure 3). The look condition
showed a signiﬁcantly higher scaled congruency
score compared to the lift condition, t(24)=
−2.93, p= .007.2 The look condition showed a
marginally signiﬁcantly higher scaled congruency
score than the feel condition, t(24)=−2.14,
p= .042. Participants were quicker to accept con-
gruent object-action pairs and hesitated longer to
reject incongruent object-action pairs when the
action proposed was look compared to lift and
feel. There was no difference between the scaled
congruency scores in the feel condition and the
lift condition t(24)= 0.20, p= .844.
One could argue that objects with salient visual
features are easier to process and therefore induced
globally quicker responses compared to objects with
salient texture and weight features. This would lead
Figure 3. Experiment 1 results: Average scaled congruency score in Experiment 1 as a function of action type. Error bars show standard errors.
2Bonferroni correction was applied for multiple comparisons; corrected signiﬁcance level was .017.
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to quicker responses to all items of the look-
congruent condition, half of the items of the lift-
incongruent condition, and half of the items of
the feel-incongruent condition. Should this be the
case, the larger congruency score in the look con-
dition compared to the lift and feel conditions
would not be a signature of a bias to overestimate
the informativeness of vision but would be an
artefactual effect. To test this account, we com-
pared the RTs of trials within the lift-incongruent
condition that presented objects with salient
texture to those that presented objects with salient
visual features. No difference in RTs was found,
t(24)= 1.23, p= .232. The RTs of trials within
the feel-incongruent condition that presented
objects with salient weight and those that presented
objects with salient visual features were also com-
pared to each other. Again, no difference in RTs
was found, t(24)= 0.58, p= .570. The look-con-
gruent condition was not informative in testing
this account, as differences in RTs amongst the
congruent conditions were confounded with the
speed to recognize the action images. The current
results suggest that the congruency score in the
look condition cannot be explained by a faster pro-
cessing of the objects from the salient visual features
category than the objects from the other two
categories.
Discussion
The present ﬁndings show a larger congruency
score in the look condition compared to the lift
and feel conditions. The congruency score in the
look condition reﬂects relatively facilitated
responses to accepting looking for the congruently
paired objects, whilst delayed responses to rejecting
looking for the incongruently paired objects.
Additional analysis ruled out the alternative
account of an object-driven processing strategy.
The current ﬁndings suggest that adults, like chil-
dren, have a tendency to overestimate the informa-
tiveness of looking when making links between
perceptual features of objects and the knowledge
to be gained from looking.
One argument against our interpretation is that
real objects have many features and hence they can
often be identiﬁed using modes of access other than
the most salient one. For example, although a
dumbbell’s most salient feature is its weight, its
shape can also be diagnostic and this information
is frequently accessed through looking. Even
though participants agreed with the object cat-
egories in the warm-up phase of the experiment,
this may not have prevented them from having
associated the objects with more than one of the
three actions when performing the task. One
could further argue that since all objects were
presented visually, participants necessarily relied
on the objects’ visual features to identify them.
Hence the actual informativeness of vision in the
current experiment could account for the overesti-
mation of its informativeness. To examine this
account, a new paradigm was employed in
Experiment 2.
EXPERIMENT 2
In this experiment, we aimed to replicate the
effect that indicates a bias to overestimate the
informativeness of vision with a different para-
digm. The new paradigm rules out a number of
low-level accounts for such a bias by differentiat-
ing itself from the paradigm employed in
Experiment 1 in the following ways. First, we
removed the visual presentation of objects so
that any effects observed could no longer be
explained by reliance on vision to perceive the
objects during the task. Second, participants
were asked to judge whether an action allows
identiﬁcation of a speciﬁc perceptual feature
rather than an object. Explicitly judging a target
perceptual feature eliminated the possibility to
associate object features with more than one
mode of access in object identiﬁcation. Third,
we reversed the order of the action-object link
to investigate whether the bias for vision is
restricted to having an action or the knowledge
to be gained as the initial input. With the
reversed action-object link, we were also able to
rule out effects that are solely driven by judging
action images.
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Method
Participants
Twenty-four French-speaking students (ten males,
mean age 23.5 years, age range 18 to 45 years) from
the Université catholique de Louvain took part in
this experiment in return for a small honorarium.
None of these participants took part in
Experiment 1. An additional two participants’
data were excluded prior to the analysis due to
having overall performance at chance level.
Design and procedure
A 3× 2 within-subject design was constructed
with action (look, feel, lift) and action-object
feature congruency (congruent, incongruent) as
factors. In the current design, we employed a new
device and a new set of objects. The objects were
no longer differentiated by textures, as textures
can often be identiﬁed by both vision and touch.
Instead, we used temperature as a new differentiat-
ing feature for objects in the feel condition.
The testing session was carried out in French.
The design of the experimental device was
explained to the participants as follows. There are
eight objects of identical shape. The objects only
vary from each other in the following aspects:
colour, temperature and weight. The objects
could be green or white; cold or warm; light or
heavy. Each object has three key features, one
from each of the three aspects. The objects are
placed inside an opaque box. To look at an object
inside the box, one can raise the lid of the box
and see the object through a window. It is not poss-
ible to feel or lift the object whilst looking at it. To
feel an object inside the box, the ﬁnger hole on one
side of the box can be utilized. It is not possible to
look at or lift an object whilst feeling it. To lift an
object inside the box, a string attached to the
object can be lifted from the top side of the box.
It is not possible to feel or look at an object
whilst lifting it. The images of an actor performing
these actions were shown to the participants as the
device was being explained to them (see Figure 1).
These action images were subsequently employed
in the test phase. All six object features were seen
equally frequently (see Table 1).
During the test phase, participants underwent a
computer-based task. Each trial began with a ﬁx-
ation cross (500 ms), followed by one of the three
aforementioned action images (2000 ms). This was
followed by a sentence that read “sait-il si l’objet
est (Does he know if the object is)” presented for
2000 ms. Finally, a feature word specifying either a
colour, temperature or weight remained on screen
until a response was detected or for 2500 ms,
during which time participants judged whether the
actor was able to obtain knowledge about the speci-
ﬁed object feature by performing the action shown
(see Figure 4). Participants engaged in yes-no
responses by left-clicking on the computer mouse
for “yes”, and right-clicking for “no”.
A total number of 144 trials were presented in
three test blocks of 48 trials. All trials were pre-
sented in a random order. Feedback was given on
the computer screen after participants responded
to each trial. The participants in Experiment 1
received feedback during the practice trials but
not during the test trials. The low error rates indi-
cate that participants did comprehend the task.
However, we felt it was important for the partici-
pants to know that they were performing correctly
so that they would have the conﬁdence to speed
up their responses. The experiment was presented
with E-prime (Schneider et al., 2002a, 2002b).
RT and accuracy on each trial were measured.
The RTs were measured from the onset of the
feature words and accuracy was calculated in a
binary manner (correct or not).
Table 1. List of objects shown to participants in Experiment 2
Colour Temperature Weight
Object 1 Green Cold Light
Object 2 Green Cold Heavy
Object 3 Green Warm Light
Object 4 Green Warm Heavy
Object 5 White Cold Light
Object 6 White Cold Heavy
Object 7 White Warm Light
Object 8 White Warm Heavy
Note: The exact French words employed were vert (green), blanc
(white), froid (cold), chaud (warm), léger (light), and lourd
(heavy).
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Results
Error analysis
Response errors (5.40%) and timeout errors (1.75%)
were a small proportion of total trials. A 3× 2
ANOVA was conducted on error rate with action
(look, feel, lift) and action-object feature congruency
(congruent, incongruent) as factors. There were no
signiﬁcant main effects of action, F(2, 46)= 1.51,
MSE= 0.002, p= .232, hp2 = .061, or action-
object feature congruency, F(1, 23)= 0.04,
MSE= 0.003, p= .838, hp2 = .002, and no sig-
niﬁcant interaction effect between action and
action-object feature congruency F(2, 46)= 0.16,
MSE= 0.003, p= .850, hp2 = .007.
Response time analysis
Response errors and timeout errors were removed
from the data set. No additional data point was
excluded from the analysis as there was no need
to correct for the overall data distribution. A 3×
2 ANOVA was conducted on RT with action
(look, feel, lift) and action-object feature con-
gruency (congruent, incongruent) as factors.
There was a signiﬁcant main effect of action,
F(2, 46)= 12.63, MSE= 5041.27, p, .001,
hp2 = .355, with the RT associated with the
feel condition (800.62 ms) being slower than that
of the lift condition (748.54 ms) and the look
condition (730.46 ms) respectively. There was
also a signiﬁcant main effect of action-object
feature congruency, F(1, 23)= 43.68, MSE=
5949.73, p, .001, hp2 = .655, with the congruent
condition (717.39 ms) being quicker than the
incongruent condition (802.36 ms). And there
was a signiﬁcant interaction effect between action
and action-object feature congruency, F(2, 46)=
6.01, MSE= 1853.20, p= .005, hp2 = .207.
The one-way ANOVA conducted on the scaled
congruency scores with action (look, feel, lift) as
the factor showed a signiﬁcant main effect of
action, F(2, 46)= 6.69, MSE= 0.001, p= .003,
hp2 = .225(see Figure 5). The look condition
showed a signiﬁcantly higher scaled congruency
score compared to the lift condition, t(23)=−3.12,
p= .005.3 The scaled congruency score in the
look condition was marginally signiﬁcantly higher
than the feel condition, t(23)=−1.93, p= .066.
Participants’ response pattern was consistent with
that predicted by a bias to overestimate the infor-
mativeness of looking. Interestingly, there was also
a marginally signiﬁcant difference between the
scaled congruency scores in the feel condition and
the lift condition, t(23)= 2.19, p= .039. The
trend for a signiﬁcant difference between the lift
and the feel conditions indicates that the informa-
tiveness of touch might also be overestimated in
this experiment.
Figure 4. Trial sequence (translated into English) used in Experiment 2: (a) shows a trial from the feel-congruent condition, (b) shows a trial
from the feel-incongruent condition.
3Bonferroni correction was applied for multiple comparisons; corrected signiﬁcance level was .017.
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One could argue that the bias to overestimate the
informativeness of vision merely arose from differ-
ences in the response speed to feature words. For
instance, quicker responses to colour words com-
pared to the weight and temperature words could
account for the larger scaled congruency score in
the look condition compared to the lift and the
feel conditions. To test this account, we compared
the RTs of trials within the lift-incongruent con-
dition that presented temperature words to those
that presented colour words. No difference was
observed in RTs, t(23)= 0.86, p= .402. The RTs
of trials within the feel-incongruent condition that
presented weight versus colour words were also com-
pared to each other, and no difference was observed
either, t(23)= 1.60, p= .123. (The look-congruent
condition was not informative in testing this
account, as differences in RTs amongst the congru-
ent conditions were confounded with the speed of
feature word recognition.) Thus, the current results
suggest that the large scaled congruency score in
the look condition cannot be accounted for by differ-
ences in the speed of feature word recognition.
We also analysed the bias for touch in the same
manner. Differences within the look-incongruent
condition and the lift-incongruent conditions
were also further analysed using the aforemen-
tioned comparisons. There was no difference
between the RTs for the weight and the tempera-
ture words in the look-incongruent condition,
t(23)= 1.26, p= .220, or between the RTs for
the temperature and the colour words in the lift-
incongruent condition, t(23)= 0.86, p= .402.
Therefore, the trend for a bias to overestimate the
informativeness of touch cannot be merely driven
by the speed of feature word recognition.
Discussion
The current experiment showed a larger scaled con-
gruency score in the look condition compared to the
lift and feel conditions. This disproportionately large
difference between the congruent and incongruent
conditions indicates a bias to overestimate the infor-
mativeness of vision. Participants were quick to
accept object feature words that were congruently
paired with looking, but slow to reject feature
words that were incongruently paired with looking.
This was a close replication of the ﬁndings from
Experiment 1. This replication suggests that the
bias to overestimate the informativeness of vision
does not depend on a particular directionality in
Figure 5. Experiment 2 results: Average Experiment 2 scaled congruency score as a function of action type in Experiment 2. Error bars show
standard errors.
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reasoning (i.e., whether the initial input is an action
or the knowledge to be gained). Additionally, by
employing a different paradigm from Experiment
1, we eliminated a number of low-level accounts
for this effect. Participants never saw images of the
objects, which removes the possibility that the
effects observed in Experiment 1 were caused by a
reliance on vision to perceive the images of objects.
Relatedly, explicit nomination of the target object
features through text did not eliminate the bias to
overestimate the informativeness of vision. This
ﬁnding lends no support to the suggestion that the
bias for vision observed in Experiment 1 came
from the competition of other unintended object
features and modes of access. Taken together,
Experiments 1 and 2 showed that the bias to overes-
timate the informativeness of vision seems robust
and survives the changes of the superﬁcial features
of the two paradigms.
In addition to the bias to overestimate the infor-
mativeness of vision, there was also a trend towards
a bias to overestimate the informativeness of touch.
This ﬁnding is consistent with some previous
developmental studies. These studies suggest that
in certain circumstances, children choose touch,
rather than vision, as their preferred mode of
access for identifying an object (O’Neill et al.,
1992; Robinson, Haigh, & Pendle, 2008). In
other circumstances, children chose equally
between vision and touch (Waters & Beck, 2009,
2012). It is noteworthy that all of these develop-
mental studies showed that different task contexts
can lead to either biases for different modes of
access or no particular bias for vision or touch. It
is likely that one or more of the changes made in
the current design provided an appropriate
context for the bias to overestimate the informa-
tiveness of touch to become observable. The
speciﬁc contexts in which biases for vision and
touch are likely to be observed will be discussed
in the General Discussion.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Evidence from developmental studies suggests that
children overestimate the knowledge to be gained
from looking (e.g., O’Neill et al., 1992; Robinson
et al., 1997). The present study investigated
whether a similar bias for vision can be observed
in the mature mental state reasoning system. Two
experiments showed that when adults reason
about others’ knowledge, they are biased to overes-
timate the informativeness of vision. This was
shown in the speeded responses in accepting the
objects and object features that were congruently
paired with looking, and increased hesitation in
rejecting the objects and object features that were
incongruently paired with looking. The present
study is the ﬁrst to show that adults, like children,
have a tendency to overestimate the informative-
ness of vision.
Origin of the overestimation of the
informativeness of vision in children
The ﬁndings that children overestimate the
informativeness of vision have been interpreted as
consequences of immature reasoning capacity
(O’Neill et al., 1992; Pillow, 1993). It has been pro-
posed that the errors children make on source of
knowledge tasks reﬂect conceptual limitations
(Gopnik & Graf, 1988) in the understanding of
how beliefs and representations about the world
causally relate to the world itself (O’Neill et al.,
1992). For example, when a 4-year-old wrongly
judges that information about the softness of an
object can be gained from looking at it, he/she
would be deemed to lack concepts of the correct
correspondence between various actions and the
kind of knowledge that can be gained from these
actions. The current ﬁnding that adults are also
biased to overestimate the informativeness of
vision weakens the conceptual limitation account
as the sole account for children’s difﬁculties.
From the high accuracies across all conditions, it
is clear that adults have the requisite source of
knowledge concepts. Hence this bias for vision in
adults likely reveals a limitation in knowledge-use,
rather than a limitation in conceptual knowledge
per se.
An analogical demonstration of adults’ limit-
ation in using acquired concepts comes from
studies which suggest that adults who have
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mature theory of mind abilities nevertheless
frequently fail to take others’ perspectives into
account (Apperly et al., 2010; Birch & Bloom,
2004; Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003). Epley,
Morewedge, and Keysar (2004) indicate that
adults and children show highly similar egocentric
tendencies (i.e., quick initial looking towards an
unintended/egocentric object) in a communication
task. However, adults are more able than children
to correct themselves and look at the intended/
non-egocentric object. In line with this ﬁnding,
Dumontheil, Apperly, and Blakemore (2010)
showed that the ability to efﬁciently overcome ego-
centric bias improves considerably from childhood
to late adolescence. Crucially, these theory of
mind studies demonstrate that although the
ability to efﬁciently overcome egocentric bias
improves with age, adults do not completely
outgrow egocentric tendencies. Hence, egocentr-
ism is constantly observed in adults’ theory of
mind use. Here we propose that a comparable
account may explain adults’ bias in source of knowl-
edge reasoning, such that the bias to overestimation
of the informativeness of vision exists even in the
mature source of knowledge reasoning system but
that adults simply beneﬁt from better executive
abilities to efﬁciently correct themselves. The
current ﬁnding thus demonstrates that limitations
in knowledge-use rather than (or in addition to)
conceptual limitations are at the origin of the over-
estimation of the informativeness of vision in
childhood.
Overestimation of the informativeness of
touch
Experiment 2 showed that in addition to a bias for
vision, adults also have a tendency to overestimate
the informativeness of touch. Prior evidence
suggests that different task contexts can lead to
biases for different modes of access, including
both vision and touch (O’Neill et al., 1992;
Robinson et al., 2008). To our knowledge,
O’Neill et al. was the only other study to demon-
strate biases to overestimate the informativeness
of both vision and touch. O’Neill et al. argued
that children were likely to show a preference to
feel an object when the judgements concerned
themselves, as this is consistent with their daily
experience. When children were asked to attribute
knowledge to others, they were likely to choose
the person who looked, as children often observe
that the person who looks obtains information
about the environment. Whilst this explanation
may account for the biases observed in
O’Neill et al., it cannot explain the biases found
in the current study, since the bias to overestimate
the informativeness of touch was shown
when adult participants made judgements about
an actor.
It is noteworthy that in O’Neill et al. (1992), the
judgements for self always coincided with children
lacking knowledge about the hidden object’s iden-
tity, and that the judgements for others coincided
with children knowing the hidden object’s identity.
We suggest that a bias for vision can be observed
both when the object identity is known (e.g.,
Experiment 1 of the current study; Experiments 2
and 3 of O’Neill et al.) and when it is unknown
(e.g., Experiment 2 of the current study;
Experiment 2 of Robinson et al., 1997). On the
other hand, a bias to overestimate the informative-
ness of touch is likely driven by the lack of knowl-
edge about the object’s identity (e.g., Experiment 2
of the current study; Experiment 1 of O’Neill et al.;
Experiment 2 of Robinson et al., 2008). One
potential explanation for the bias to overestimate
the informativeness of touch to only occur under
such a condition is that in our daily experience we
obtain much information about an unknown
object by feeling it (or to be precise, feeling it
whilst looking at it). Although as previously men-
tioned, vision often allows us to identify known
objects and their textures without even feeling the
objects, we do often explore unknown objects by
making physical contact with them. Hence the
observed bias to overestimate the informativeness
of touch may be caused by lacking of knowledge
about objects’ identity. To clarify, we do not
claim that the presentation of unknown objects
guarantees that a bias for touch will occur.
Nonetheless, not knowing objects’ identities is
likely to be a prerequisite to showing a bias to over-
estimate the informativeness of touch.
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Conclusion
Across two experiments we showed that adults have
a tendency to overestimate the informativeness of
vision when making simple source of knowledge
judgements. This bears a close resemblance to the
biases observed in children (O’Neill et al., 1992;
Robinson et al., 1997). We also found a trend
that indicates overestimation of the informativeness
of touch when adults have little knowledge about
the objects’ identities. Both of these biases reveal
imperfection in the mature mental state reasoning
system, which carries implications on the interpret-
ations offered by previous developmental studies to
explain imperfections in children’s mental state
reasoning system. In particular, it shows that
children’s errors cannot solely be accounted for by
conceptual limitations but originate, at least
partly, from the same biases that adults need to
overcome. Further examinations into how our
interactions with the world shape our reasoning
about the knowledge that we gain from these inter-
actions are necessary for a complete account of the
cognitive characteristics of source of knowledge
reasoning.
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